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BOOK REVIEW
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Reviewed by John V Orth*

On any list of America's greatest judges, John Marshall, the great Chief
Justice, is sure to appear-usually at the top.' Judicial greatness is demonstrated not by a single great opinion but by a series of great decisions

* William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel

Hill. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. Perhaps the best known list of the greatest American judges was propounded by Dean
Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School in lectures he delivered at the Tulane Law School
in 1936 on the centennial of Edward Livingston's death. Listed in chronological order, "the
ten judges who must be ranked first in American judicial history" are as follows: John
Marshall, James Kent, Joseph Story, John Bannister Gibson, Lemuel Shaw, Thomas Ruffin,
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Charles Doe, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo. RoscoE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERiCAN LAW 30 n.2 (1938). A 1978
statistical study reported that Marshall is "commonly acclaimed as the most important of all
American jurists." ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JusTICEs:

STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNiTED STATES 40

(1978). A more recent list by Bernard Schwartz, limited to United States Supreme Court
justices, also begins with Marshall and includes the following: Joseph Story, Roger Brooke
Taney, Stephen J. Field, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, Charles Evans
Hughes, Hugo Lafayette Black, Earl Warren, and William J. Brennan, Jr. Bernard Schwartz,
Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA LJ.93, 94 (1995).
The reverse inquiry, identifying the least significant justice, has also been attempted.
See David P. Currie, The Most InsignificantJustice: A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. CEH. L.
REv. 466, 480 (1983) (unable to reach a definitive conclusion); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Most InsignificantJustice: FurtherEvidence, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 481, 496 (1983) (nominating Justice Thomas Todd).
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rendered over a course of years. A precondition of greatness is, therefore,
a long judicial tenure. Judicial greatness also implies impact: great
decisions are seen to make a difference, usually by the judge's own
contemporaries as well as by posterity. Great judicial opinions are wellwritten, usually including at least a few quotable passages. Therefore, great
judges must possess a modicum of literary style.
The foundations of Marshall's greatness are firmly laid. He presided
for thirty-four years over the United States Supreme Court.2 Of the
hundreds of opinions he authored, many were recognized immediately as
important state papers. Trained in the plain style of eighteenth-century
English prose, he wrote simple, clear, unornamented sentences, enlivened
by occasional epigrams. 3
Longevity alone does not ensure eminence in judging or in any other
occupation, and a voluminous output is only a necessary, not a sufficient,
condition of judicial greatness. A great judicial opinion is, above all,
recognized as persuasive, first by the litigants and legal community, and
also by the public at large. In Mitchell v. United States,4 his last reported
opinion as Chief Justice, Marshall dismissed "the hope of deciding causes
to the mutual satisfaction of parties" as "chimerical" and set the more
realistic goals of "convincing them that the case has been fully and fairly
considered, that due attention has been given to the arguments of counsel,
and that the best judgment of the Court has been exercised on the
case ... ."' Of course, persuading the public means stating the issue more
broadly and associating it with principles of general application, a task at
which Marshall famously excelled.

2. While none of the authors whose books are reviewed dwell on the practical impact
of Marshall's long tenure, Hobson notes in his preface that "[a]s chief justice of the United
States from 1801 to 1835, [Marshall] remained on the public stage far longer than his
political contemporaries." CHARLES F. HOBsoN, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW ix (1996).
3. There is a surprising paucity of quotations from Marshall in the books under review
and a surprising lack of appreciation for Marshall's literary style, which even Oliver Wendell
Holmes admitted was "good." OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES, SPEECHES 89-90 (1918).
Consider, for example, the grand cadence of Marshall's oft-quoted statement of the holding
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional." Also ignored is Marshall's occasional flair for
epigram. Perhaps the most famous, also from McCulloch, is the eminently quotable "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy." Id. at 431. The reviewer's personal favorite
is from Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), a case concerning Indian title.
Marshall's language and sentiment would have appealed to Holmes: "Conquest gives a title
which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny ..... Id. at 588.
4. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
5. Id. at 723.
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The quality of Marshall's judgment, including its source and exercise,
is the subject of three new books. Jean Edward Smith's John Marshall:
Definer of a Nation is a full-length biography.6 Herbert A. Johnson's The
Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835 surveys Marshall's judicial
contribution as part of a series on Chief Justiceships of the United States
Supreme Court,7 while Charles F. Hobson's The Great ChiefJustice: John
Marshall and the Rule of Law' is a study primarily of Marshall's great
constitutional decisions.
Marshall was forty-five years old when he became Chief Justice.
Aside from insignificant service on the Richmond City Hustings Court, it
was his first judicial assignment. Without the Chief Justiceship to crown
his career, Marshall would have deserved an honorable mention in the
annals of the early Republic. As a soldier in the Revolutionary War, he
served at Valley Forge.9 As a leader of the Richmond bar, he served in the
state legislature and ardently supported the Constitution at the Virginia
ratifying convention. As a national statesman, he was one of three
American envoys to France who vindicated republican virtue by refusing
to accede to French demands for a bribe in the notorious XYZ Affair.
After briefly serving in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Federalist
from Virginia, Marshall attained his highest political office, Secretary of
State, in the waning months of John Adams's Administration.
Smith covers Marshall's pre-Supreme Court years fully and fairly.
Marshall emerges as the strongest and most principled of the American
envoys'0 in Smith's account of the XYZ Affair. The story of the duel of

6. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996).
7. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835
(1997). The series is edited by Johnson and published by the University of South Carolina
Press. Other volumes in the series include WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JusTIcEsHIPs OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH
(1995), JAMEs W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUsTICEsHiP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910
(1995), and MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DivIsioN AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
STONE AND VINSON, 1941-1953 (1997).
8. HOBSON, supra note 2.
9. After recounting Marshall's service at the battle of Great Bridge, Smith reports that
"Thomas Jefferson shared Washington's tactical opinion and extravagantly predicted that
Norfolk would become a second Carthage. Paraphrasing Cicero, he wrote to his friend John
Page, 'Delenda est Norfolk' [Norfolk must be destroyed]." SMrrH, supra note 6, at 50. As
Jefferson must have known, the classic call for the destruction of Carthage was delivered not
by Cicero but by Cato the Elder. See PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF a NOBLE GREcIANs AND
ROMANS 276-90 (John Dryden trans., 1952) (life of Marcus Cato).
10. Smith seems to make one minor misreading of an original document in his
reconstruction of events surrounding the XYZ Affair. In the text Smith reports:
News of Marshall's appointment as diplomatic envoy was greeted
enthusiastically by the Federalists, but the Republicans were skeptical.
One exception was Marshall's old friend St. George Tucker. Tucker
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wills between the greedy French foreign minister, Talleyrand, and the U.S.
envoy reads like a subtle diplomatic thriller. Overall, Smith allows the
characters and their motives to come to life from the documents with few
authorial comments.
As Chief Justice, Marshall was famous for his ability to charm all those
around him, particularly his opponents. Johnson illustrates this in his study
of Marshall's Court years: "Quite frequently, objective scholars working
upon Marshall have been converted from impartial observers into impassioned Marshall advocates."" All three authors apparently succumbed;
this reviewer certainly did. For his intelligence, patience, good humor,
courage, compassion, and companionship, Marshall is exemplary. His
invalid wife required lifelong care which Marshall tenderly provided.'
Despite the antebellum South's emphasis on honor and dignity, Marshall
saw nothing inconsistent between his status and personally doing the daily
household shopping 3 or leading the weekly housecleaning with "mop in

attended a farewell dinner for Marshall at the Eagle Tavern in Richmond and had a private conversation with him afterward. Immediately
following that discussion, Tucker wrote to a friend "that of all the
to'ther side men that I know he [Marshall] appears to me to preserve the
best disposition to conciliate and to preserve our pacific relations with
France."
SMITH, supra note 6, at 186-87. In the note to this text, Smith comments: "Tucker's
reference to 'side men' indicates that it was assumed that Pinckney, as the senior of the
envoys, would be the principal spokesman." Id. at 585 n.98. In context, however, it seems
more plausible to read Tucker's phrase "the to'ther side men" as referring to men on "the
other side" politically, that is, the Federalists. See 18 THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY
290 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "tother"). What Tucker seems to be saying, in other words, is
that of all the Federalists, Marshall was the least likely to upset the peace with France.
11. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 3. Johnson notes that Senator Albert J. Beveridge's
classic four-volume biography of Marshall, published in 1916-19, "exhibits little criticism
of Marshall, and scant sympathy for the Chief Justice's detractors and opponents." Id.
Johnson concludes that "for the good senator, it would appear that Marshall exhibited all of
the outstanding qualities of citizenship and duty that Progressives of Beveridge's day held
in high esteem." Id. One who did not succumb to Marshall's charm was Clarence Darrow's
law partner, Edgar Lee Masters, later famous as the author of THE SPOON RIVER
ANTHOLOGY (1916).

See EDGAR LEE MASTERS, THE NEW STAR CHAMBER AND OTHER

ESSAYS 37-50 (1904) (critical essay on Marshall originally published in the Chicago
Chronicle on the occasion of the centenary of Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice). See
also John V. Orth, The Law in Spoon River, 16 LEGAL STUD. F. 301, 304 (1992).
12. Mary (Polly) Ambler Marshall, ten years Marshall's junior, suffered many of the
health problems, physical as well as psychological, that afflicted middle class women in the
nineteenth century. Smith identifies two "mental breakdowns": the first in September 1786,
brought about when 20-year-old Polly suffered a miscarriage only months after the death of
another child born in June; the second in 1807, in response to news that a mob in Baltimore
had hanged her husband in effigy after the acquittal of Aaron Burr. SMrrH, supra note 6, at
107, 375.
13. Marshall's unassuming manners and easy-going nature are demonstrated in a
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hand... and a handkerchief tied about his head."'
The three books in review present differing perspectives that affect the
final product. The only substantial question about Smith's biography as it
concerns the pre-Court years is one of proportion. Although quoting John
Randolph of Roanoke as saying that Marshall's "'real worth was never
known until he was appointed Chief Justice,""'.. Smith devotes 280 pages
to Marshall's life before he was named to the Court and less than 250
pages to the years as Chief Justice. 6 Smith's analysis of Marshall's
judicial contribution is less penetrating than Johnson's or Hobson's, so he
is less effective at finding the sources of Marshall's jurisprudence in his
prior career. In contrast, Johnson surveys the Marshall Court's entire
judicial output including the decisions of the justices while on circuit and
is, in consequence, the best source for understanding the working life of the
Court. Unfortunately, the book's predominantly topical arrangement
obscures the sense of chronological development.' Hobson is particularly
determined to refute the charge that Marshall was unlearned in the law and
makes a real contribution in his exploration of the connections between

remarkable anecdote concerning his shopping in the Richmond farmer's market:
One day, as he loitered with his produce, a young gentleman new to
Richmond, who had never seen Marshall before, offered the poorly
dressed chief justice a small coin to carry a plump turkey he had just
purchased. Marshall obligingly added the turkey to his own provisions
and trudged respectfully behind his new employer to a house not far
from his own, whereupon he handed the bird to its owner and pocketed
the coin flipped in his direction. The incident, witnessed by many at
the market, sent the city into gales of laughter, although Marshall kindly
noted that "we were going the same way" and it seemed only neighborly.
Id. at 376.
14. Id.
15. Id.at 280 (quoting John Randolph, quoted in EDwARD S. CoRwiN, JoHN MARSHALL
AND THE CONsTrrmoN 52 (1919)).
16. In addition, Smith packs a good deal of interesting information into the 150 pages
of endnotes, which unfortunately lack running heads to identify the pages (or even the
chapters) to which they relate.
17. Johnson's book also suffers from typographical and other minor errors, and one is
tempted to say it needed a good editor. For example, Marshall is said to have believed that
by issuing paper currency "the republic sewed [sic] the seeds of its future decline,"
JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 14; Justice James Iredell is at one point described as being from
South rather than North Carolina, id.at 26; and Samuel Swartwout's name is repeatedly
misspelled, id. at 124-25. Moreover, the discussion of the Cherokee Cases is confusingly
divided into three or four segments, see id. at 81-84, 94, 248-55, 257-61; and repetitions
occasionally distract the reader's attention, see id. at 75 nn.60-61, 254 n.87, 261 n.15.
"During Marshall's chiefjusticeship," the reader is informed at one point, "the circuits were
arranged into the configuration they would have throughout Marshall's chief justiceship."
Id. at 120.
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Marshall's background, both intellectual and practical, and his judicial
decisions; the future Chief Justice's business experience in Richmond is
particularly emphasized." Although he owned slaves and vast tracts of
land, Marshall was never a planter and his outlook was more commercial
than agrarian or patriarchal.
Marshall's opportunity to become Chief Justice came when John Jay
declined the offer by President John Adams. Jay had been the nation's first
Chief Justice, serving from 1789 to 1795, but he refused to serve again,
writing Adams that he had
left the bench perfectly convinced that under a system so defective
it would not obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which are
essential to its affording due support to the national government,
nor acquire the public confidence and respect which, as the last
resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess. 9
Learning of Jay's refusal, the President turned to Marshall, as the latter
modestly
recalled years later, and said, "'I believe I must nominate
20
you."
The choice was vindicated because Marshall seemed to know exactly
how to exploit the latent potential of the Supreme Court. It is true, but
only half true, to say as Hobson does that "[t]hroughout his chief justiceship Marshall exhibited a shrewd and discriminating sense of the limits of
judicial power."' 2' He also possessed an uncanny sense of its potential
extent. By the end of his tenure thirty-four years later, the Court was

18. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 74.
Without question his interests as a property owner and supporter of
business enterprise, along with his experience as a lawyer representing
merchants, planters, creditors, and debtors, shaped his thinking about the
relationship between law and the economy. From the time he began
practicing law in the 1780s, Marshall had a lifelong identification with
the urban, commercial interests of Richmond. He regularly invested in
companies chartered by the Virginia legislature to improve river
navigation, construct canals, and build turnpikes, and also subscribed to
stock in banks and insurance companies. As a direct participant in these
projects, he acquired knowledge of Virginia's political economy and
gained an appreciation of the role of corporations in promoting commercial prosperity.
Id.

19.4 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 285 (Henry P. Johnston
ed., 1893). Jay's revealing comment about the "defective" judicial system is not mentioned
by any of the three authors.
20. SMITH, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting President John Adams, quoted in JoHN
MARSHALL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 30 (John Stokes Adams ed., 1937)).
21. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 151.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/12
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functionally a coordinate branch of the federal government. If one man
made it so, that man was Marshall. If not quite "the definer of a nation,"
as Smith would have it in his subtitle,' Marshall was in significant ways
the definer of the Supreme Court and, as Hobson realizes, to a significant
degree the inventor of American constitutional law.'
Like the great English jurist Lord Mansfield, Marshall seemed
determined to make a difference from the very beginning of his Chief
Justiceship.24 The first reported appellate decision of his court, Talbot v.
Seeman,' marked a change so significant, but so successful, that it almost
eludes observation today. Talbot was "the first case in which the justices
of the Supreme Court labeled their decision the 'Opinion of the Court."' 26
Smith, a political scientist, recognizes the implications of this change and
stresses it by entitling his first chapter on Marshall's Chief Justiceship
"Opinion of the Court."' 7 Before Marshall, the Supreme Court spoke with

22. It is surely too much to say, as Smith does, that "Marshall transformed the
Constitution from a compact among the states into a charter of national life ... ." SMrTH,
supra note 6, at 19.
23. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 212 ("More than anyone else, John Marshall invented
American constitutional law, a novel branch of law that brought constitutional interpretation
into the ordinary task of adjudicating lawsuits.").
24. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, LoRD MANSFLD 52-82 (photo. reprint 1979) (1936). Hobson
admits taking Fifoot's study of Mansfield as a model for his own book. HOBSON, supra note
2, at 247. He even paraphrases Mansfield himself while describing Marshall. Compare id.
at 184 ("A notable instance in which inclination drew Marshall one way and a string of
precedents the other occurred on circuit in 1811 . . . .") with FIFOOT, supra, at 201 ("'A
judge on the bench,' [Mansfield] told Garrick, 'is now and then in your whimsical situation
between Tragedy and Comedy, inclination drawing him one way and a long string of
precedents the other."' (quoting JOHN HOLLIDAY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM LATE EARL OF
MANSRFLD 211 (1797))). The ironies in this comparison are multiple: The "string of precedents" that constrained Marshall had been too much even for Mansfield. HOBSON, supra
note 2, at 184. The 1811 circuit court case, referred to above, was Livingston v. Jefferson,
15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811), a case challenging the propriety of a land seizure made
during Jefferson's presidency, and one that worried the ex-President mightily. SMrrH, supra
note 6, at 397-99, 404-06. Jefferson thought Mansfield a pernicious influence on American
judges, see HOBSON, supra note 2, at 36-37, yet in ruling for Jefferson, Marshall not only
prominently cited Mansfield but also read the ex-President a lecture on the English jurist,
hailing him as "'one of the greatest Judges who ever sat on any bench, & who has done
more than any other to remove those technical impediments which grew out of a different
state of society, & too long continued to obstruct the course of substantial justice."' Id. at
37 (quoting Livingston, supra, at 664).
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 201 (misprinting the
defendant's name as "Seemen").
26. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 292-93.
27. Id. at 282. Hobson and Johnson both recognize the novelty of the "Opinion of the
Court," but neither stress its great institutional significance. Hobson refers to it obliquely
in his discussion of influences on Marshall: "From [Edmund] Pendleton's example the future
chief justice learned a style of leadership in which the court most often spoke through its
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many voices, like virtually every common-law court in history. Accordingly, each participating judge delivered an opinion one after the other,
seriatim. While the result in individual cases (the res judicata effect) is
clear, the reasoning-and therefore the precedential value (the stare decisis
effect)-is often cloudy. Yet the Marshall Court, speaking with one voice,
and usually the voice of the Chief Justice, greatly enhanced the Court's
influence. None knew this more than Thomas Jefferson who repeatedly
railed at the practice.2"
The Court's unified opinions were announced through a megaphone
that amplified its voice. What it said in this louder voice was the true
measure of its greatness. Hobson finds the "central thrust" of Marshall's
decisions was "to allow the political departments broad scope to accomplish the objects confided to them by the Constitution and laws."'29 That
much is clear. Marshall was no "Platonic guardian"; 0 he never sought
to usurp legislative powers. Indeed, one may go further and suggest that
Marshall affirmatively sought to force the political departments of the
national government to do their duty. In McCulloch v. Maryland'
Marshall upheld the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, a
decision that may have enraged elements in some states but must have
pleased the majority in Congress that passed the chartering statute and the
President who signed it. In Gibbons v. Ogden32 Marshall struck down
New York's steamboat monopoly because of federal preemption by the
Federal Coasting Licensing Act. Hobson noted "astudied ambiguity that
made [the opinion] an uncertain guide for subsequent cases arising under

presiding judge and a practical approach to the art ofjudging that emphasized substance over
technicalities." HOBSON, supra note 2, at 34. Johnson emphasizes the protective value of
the unanimous opinion in the political climate of the early years of the Jefferson Administration: "Seizing upon the Ellsworth Court's use of the per curiam opinion, Marshall
introduced the 'opinion of the Court' device in his first term and used it effectively to protect
individual members from identification with unpopular decisions." JOHNSON, supra note 7,
at 100.
28. SMITH, supra note 6, at 448 & 662 n.72, 456 & 666 n.155. Jefferson lobbied certain
Justices directly and indirectly to restore seriatim opinions and even suggested a statute
requiring the practice. Id. at 456.
29. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 151. Hobson later suggests that Marshall deferred to
Congress for prudential reasons: "Marshall, to be sure, well understood the Court's
vulnerability to political forces, and this understanding powerfully reinforced his inclination
to concede to Congress ample discretion to conduct its legislative business without judicial
intervention." Id. at 159. Marshall was indeed constantly and acutely aware of his Court's
"vulnerability to political forces," but in his day he probably feared that Congress would do
too little rather than too much.
30. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).

31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
32. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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the commerce clause."33 However, it is odd that Hobson discusses
Gibbons without mentioning slavery. The slavery question may have led
the usually pellucid Marshall to prefer ambiguity. An expansive reading
of the Commerce Clause would have meant federal preemption of state
actions like the Negro Seamen Acts,34 which were designed to bolster the
security of a slave-owning society but that incidentally trenched on
interstate commerce, as Justice William Johnson made plain in his separate
concurrence in Gibbons."
Hobson rightly recognizes that for Marshall "preservation of the
Constitution and union took precedence over the immediate eradication of
slavery."36 What seems to escape Hobson is that Marshall may have seen
the two goals of union and abolition as ultimately related. If the economy
of the United States could be made so completely integrated that to disrupt
it would be contrary to the self-interest of the vast majority, and if the
"political departments" could be made to do their job of brokering
conflicting sectional issues, then there might be hope for some compromise
or, more likely, a series of compromises on slavery, eventually leading to
its abolition. Marshall had seen agreement at the 1787 Constitutional
Convention and again in the Compromise of 1820, and he had watched the

slow extinction of slavery inthe British Empire. While not a dreamer, and
toward the end of his life increasingly pessimistic about the prospect,
Marshall did seem to have a strategic vision of forcing, insofar as he could,
the national government to govern the nation. Marshall's inveterate
opposition to states' rights is best seen neither as a preference for centralized decision-making per se, as in Gibbons, nor as a preference for any
particular national decision, as in favor of the Bank of the United States in
McCulloch. Instead, his opposition should be viewed as a recognition that
decentralized decision-making, particularly decentralized economic
decision-making, would make disunion increasingly possible.37
For the Supreme Court to play a leading role in national life, the young
nation needed an ethos in which law mattered. Marshall observed in
Marbury v. Madison38 that "[t]he government of the United States has
33. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 145.
34. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 21, 1822, 7 S.C. Stat. 470 (act declared unconstitutional in
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F.Cas. 493 (C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No.4366)).
35. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 230.
36. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 164.
37. See John J. Gibbons, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. Rv. 222, 226 (1975) (reviewing
CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME V:
THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64 (1974)) ("Marshall knew early in his career that the glue which
would hold the Union together was economic interdependence. It seems overly simple, and
overly generous to Taney, then, to divorce his economic views from his sectionalist and
slavery views.") (footnote omitted).
38. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."39 Smith
seemingly takes him at his word and describes Marshall's opinion of the
Court in Marbury as "a primer on representative government, a rationale
for the rule of law."4 Hobson also associates Marshall and the rule of law
in the subtitle to his book. Although its great importance is conceded on
all sides, the rule of law is nowhere clearly defimed.4 1 In his last reported
opinion as Chief Justice, Marshall implicitly associated the rule of law with
paying attention to the arguments of counsel, giving full and fair consideration to each
case, and deciding in accordance with the Court's "best
42
judgment.
The picture emerging from some of the cases is more complicated.
The Antelope,43 for example, concerned the disposition of a ship and its
cargo of Africans seized for an alleged violation of the federal law
prohibiting the importation of slaves." In his opinion for the Court,
Marshall denounced the slave trade as contrary to natural law, but
recognized that it was permitted by the positive law of some nations.45
Because the ship flew the flag of a country that permitted the slave trade,
the ship had to be returned to its owners. 4' The slaves also had to be
returned, but the Court found the claims to only a small number of the
Africans were substantiated.47 Pursuant to federal law, the unclaimed
slaves were freed and transported to Liberia.48 Smith describes Marshall's
decision in The Antelope as reflecting "the approach he often took in highly
contentious cases. The principle enunciated went in one direction, but the

39. Id. at 163.
40. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 326. "Marshall stood for the rule of law and a government
of checks and balances." Id. at 334.
41. The rule of law has been described as "[a] concept of the utmost importance but
having no defined, nor readily definable, content." DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO LAW 1093 (1980). See John V. Orth, On the Relation Between the Rule of
Law andPublic Opinion, 80 MICH. L. REv. 753 (1982) (reviewing RICHARD A. COSoROVE,
THE RULE OF LAw: ALBERT VENN DICEY, VICTORIAN JURIST (1980)); see also A.V. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTON (10th ed. 1959)
(popularizing the modem usage of the term). Although the phrase is used in America, its
primary function is served by the words "due process of law." But see Richard H. Fallon,

Jr., "The Rule ofLaw" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17
(1997) (discussing the various purposes served by the rule of law). The spread of the rule
of law is much discussed today in foreign policy circles. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The
Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998).
42. See Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 712, 723 (1835).
43. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
44. Id. at 114.
45. Id. at 120-22.
46. Id. at 123.
47. Id. at 128.
48. Id. at 132-33.
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pragmatic application of that principle allowed the Court to arrive at a
decision more in conformity with the natural justice of the case."49 Thus,
in The Antelope Marshall recognized the legality-if not the morality-of
the slave trade under certain circumstances, but "devised a formula that set
80 percent of the Africans free." 50
Cohens v. Virginia" illustrates another characteristic of Marshall's
judging. Pursuant to congressional legislation, the District of Columbia
conducted a national lottery to raise money for municipal services.52
Virginia law prohibited the sale in Virginia of out-of-state lottery tickets,
and the Cohens were convicted in state court for violating that law.53 The
Supreme Court, speaking through Marshall, upheld its jurisdiction against
a vigorous states' rights challenge because of the need for uniform
interpretation of federal law,' but affirmed the conviction because of its
finding that Congress had not intended to authorize the sale of national
lottery tickets outside the District of Columbia." Smith describes the
result in practical terms as follows:
The Court could easily enforce its decision as to jurisdiction, but
it could not compel Virginia to admit federal lottery tickets against
its will. If Virginia defied the Court and persisted in arresting
those selling out-of-state ducats, there would be little the justices

49. SMITH, supra note 6, at 488. Hobson sums up the case in similar terms: "If
Marshall's answer to the general question seemed favorable to the Spanish and Portuguese

claims [to the slaves], his actual disposition of the particular case substantially increased the
number of Africans awarded to the United States and thus designated for eventual release
and transportation back to Africa." HOBSON, supra note 2, at 168.
50. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 487. There is a chilling calculation in the partial justice
delivered, reminiscent of the original rule in the Constitution apportioning representation in
Congress whereby a slave was counted as three-fifths of a person. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2,

amended by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
51. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
52. Id. at 285.
53. Id. at 375.

54. Id. at 416. Although Marshall himself spoke of "the necessity of uniformity," id.
at 418, the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 had a more limited goal. Section 25 of the Act
conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court over final judgments in the highest
state courts (1) holding against the validity of a treaty, federal statute, or "an authority
exercised under the United States"; (2) upholding the validity of a state statute or "an
authority exercised under any state" against a challenge based on the federal Constitution,
a treaty, or federal law; or (3) holding against a "title, right, privilege, or exemption" claimed
under the federal Constitution, a treaty, federal statute, or commission. Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86. In other words, state courts could recognize greater
federal rights without triggering a right of appeal; uniformity was not essential in cases
favoring federal authority.
55. Id. at 444-47.
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could do. Marshall was too astute to press an issue the Court

could not win. 6
In addition, if Congress had revisited the issue and enacted a statute
authorizing the sale of national lottery tickets in interstate commerce, the
Court presumably would have the national legislature on its side in any
future challenge.
Johnson also notes Marshall'sjudicial pragmatism. In Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia" a closely divided Court held, in an opinion by the Chief
Justice, that it lacked original jurisdiction over a suit by an Indian tribe
against a state.
For jurisdictional standing under the Constitution, the
tribe would have to be either a foreign nation or an American state; 9 the
majority found that the tribe was neither.' "The 3 to 2 decision," Johnson
observes, "avoided conflict with the political branches of government and
the potential embarrassment of having the Court's decree ignored ...."
Marbury v. Madison,62 the case usually credited with establishing
judicial review, is itself customarily analyzed in practical terms.63 The
plaintiffs were Federalists appointed to office by President John Adams in
the last days of his administration. The incoming Republicans, led by
President Thomas Jefferson, were determined not to surrender the commissions. The plaintiffs claimed entitlement to commissions in the keeping of
the Secretary of State and brought an action in the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary to
deliver the documents.' In his opinion for the Court, Marshall, after
extensive dicta in favor of the plaintiffs' right, held that the Court lacked
jurisdiction." Although the Judiciary Act seemed to confer jurisdiction
over such suits, Marshall found the Act unconstitutional to that extent.
From the day of its decision up to the present, Marbury has been

56. SMrrH, supra note 6, at 459.
57. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
58. Id. at 15-19.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies
between two or more States ... and between a State,... and foreign States .....
60. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15-19.
61. JOHNSON, supranote 7, at 253. Elsewhere Johnson points out that executive powers
were also constrained in this case: "In terms of power politics, even if [President Andrew]
Jackson had wished to protect the Cherokee, it would have been virtually impossible to do
so, given the [small] size of the federal army and the determination of the government and
people of Georgia [to resist]." Id. at 94.
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
63. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JuDIcIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMEIucAN HISTORY 31-34 (1987).
64. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137-38.
65. Id. at 176-77.
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recognized as a case charged with great political significance. The case
seemed to confront the Court with a cruel dilemma. If it ordered the
Secretary of State to deliver the commissions and he refused, the Court
would have no way to enforce the order; enforcement was the responsibility of the executive branch. Alternatively, if the Court declined to issue the
writ of mandamus, the Court would be viewed as succumbing to Jefferson
and the Republicans. Instead, Marshall refused to issue the writ, but for a
reason that amounted to a claim of high prerogative-a claim, furthermore,
with which the political branches could not interfere.'
What made Marbury a case of judicial review, rather than mere
statutory interpretation, was that the holding was based on the Constitution
rather than on the Judiciary Act. Smith thinks this was unavoidable: "The
writ to which Marbury was entitled," he writes, "was unmistakably
provided for by statute ... ."67 If true, this clear entitlement would be
remarkable because one of the principal drafters of that act was Justice
William Paterson,6" who joined in the Marbury opinion. Of course, it is
possible, as Hobson believes, that Paterson's handiwork had "flaws" that
even he came to admit.69 Hobson makes a spirited plea for Marshall's
reading of the relevant section of the statute as repugnant to the Constitution. Recognizing that there were "alternative constructions that reconciled
the judiciary act and the Constitution," Hobson nonetheless maintains that
"[o]n reflection ... it is clear" that Marshall adhered to his own rule of
statutory construction: a judge must be persuaded beyond a reasonable
doubt before declaring a statute void as contrary to the Constitution. 0
Hobson defends Marshall's application of this rule in Marbury:
His espousal of the rule was not a self-serving, hypocritical
expression of courtesy and deference to the legislature but a
genuinely operative standard he faithfully employed in constitutional adjudication. Confining review only to instances where the
repugnancy between statute and Constitution was plain, clear, and
unequivocal did not mean that the infraction had to be so obvious,
so palpable, that it could readily be detected by comparing the texts
of the two laws. If this were the meaning of the rule, then judicial
review would be a trivial, insignificant power that would almost

66. ORTH, supra note 63, at 33.
67. S TrH, supra note 6, at 318.
68. Id. at 288. Paterson had also been a prominent delegate to the Constitutional
Convention. Id. at 287-88. The other principal drafter was Oliver Ellsworth, Chief Justice
before Marshall. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 69.
69. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 69. The only evidence that Paterson ever admitted flaws
in the Judiciary Act seems to be that he joined in the opinion in Marbury.
70. Id. at 67-68.
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never be invoked, for in this sense there could scarcely be any law
that was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."
At least one scholar, Akhil Amar, "has suggested that Marshall misread
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act and that Congress had no intention of
conferring original mandamus jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court."72
Oddly, none of the authors quote the relevant passages. The Constitution
expressly limits the Court's original jurisdiction to "all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a
State shall be Party.' 73 In all other cases the Court's jurisdiction is
appellate. The plaintiffs in Marbury relied on the following sentence inthe
Judiciary Act:74
The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the
circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein
after specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of
prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts
appointed, or 75persons holding office, under the authority of the
United States.
The plaintiffs in Marbury read only parts of the above sentence: "The
Supreme Court ...shall have power to issue .. . writs of mandamus, in
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any ... persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States. 76 In context,
however, the whole sentence may apply only to the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction. If that is true, then the statute's repugnance to the Constitution
vanishes. The plaintiffs in Marbury would still lose but on a construction

71. Id. at 68. Hobson belatedly concedes, in connection with his discussion of the
Cherokee Cases, that in Marbury "the chief justice escaped an awkward dilemma by denying
jurisdiction." Id. at 176.
72. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 62 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and
the OriginalJurisdictionofthe Supreme Court, 56 U. CHL. L. REv. 443 (1989), but misspelling Amar as "Akmar"). Johnson himself is associated with the same suggestion in a coauthored book. 2 GEORGE LEE HAsKiNs & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POVER: JOHN MARSHALL,

1801-15, at 199 (1981). For an even earlier statement of the same argument see John J.
Gibbons, The Interdependence ofLegitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning ofSeparation
of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. Rv. 435, 448-49 (1974).
73. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2.
74. Marbury, at 148.
75. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
76. Id; Marbury, at 148.
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of the statute, not the Constitution. Marshall probably reached out for a
rationale that was strictly unnecessary but very eye-catching. Depriving the
Court of an apparent power to issue writs of mandamus in original actions,
Marshall secured for the Court a far greater power-the power of judicial
review. Remarkably, the Court's power expanded in a context of selfdenial.7 The Court would not exercise an unconstitutional power even
when seemingly encouraged to do so by Congress. While hypocritical may
be too strong a word to describe Marshall's tone in Marbury, sanctimonious
is not.
The conclusion is inescapable-at least to this reviewer-that Marshall
deliberately rejected a rationale based on humdrum statutory construction
in favor of a momentous constitutional holding. Years later, in connection
with a circuit court case concerning Virginia'sNegro Seaman Act, Marshall
wrote in a private letter to Justice Joseph Story: "'A case was brought
before me in which I might have considered its constitutionality, but it was
not absolutely necessary and, as I am not fond of butting against a wall in
sport, I escaped on the construction of the act."' 78 In Marbwy Marshall
might equally have "escaped" but chose not to in order to teach the
Republicans a lesson concerning the wall that separated the powers of
government.
Marshall's escape in Marbwy from a confrontation with the powersthat-be contrasts with his apparently provocative behavior in another case
a few years later. United States v. Burr79 was a prosecution of former
Vice President Aaron Burr for treason, over which Marshall presided while
on circuit. At trial the defendant deliberately posed the difficult question
of whether the court could subpoena the President of the United States to
compel the delivery of documents necessary for the defense." Hobson's
comment is revealing: "In only one other case besides Marbury did

77. Hobson concludes:
The narrow scope of judicial review set forth in Marbwy stands in
sharp contrast to the expansive reach the doctrine has acquired in the
twentieth century. For Marshall, judicial review was primarily a
defensive weapon to preserve the independence of the judiciary, to resist
encroachments by the states on the national government, and to protect
private rights against infiingement by acts of government (mainly state).
HOBSON, supra note 2, at 69. Marbury was, of course, defensive. However, it is speculative
to conclude from it (and from the fact that the Marshall Court never again found an act of
Congress unconstitutional) that Marshall would not have exercised judicial review more
"aggressively" if confronted with a more activist Congress.

78. SMmi, supra note 6, at 473 (quoting Letter, Marshall to Story (Sept. 1823) in 9
PAPERS (forthcoming 1998) (referring to Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239
(C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17,846))).
79. 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693).
80. 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
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Marshall presume to make the highest government officers answerable to
judicial process. On circuit in 1807, he issued a subpoena duces tecum to
President Jefferson .... . 8" Indeed, Marshall did more; in granting Burr's
application for bail, he seemed to indulge a rare display of passion against
"the highest government officers." 2 After quoting Sir William Blackstone on the propriety of pre-trial detention, Marshall exclaimed: "I do not
understand him as meaning to say that the hand of malignity may grasp
any individual against whom its hate may be directed, or whom it may
capriciously seize, charge him with some secret crime, and put him on the
proof of his innocence."83 Jefferson certainly thought Marshall was talking
about him."

Why would the great Chief Justice so sedulously avoid a confrontation
with the executive in Marbury and later seem to court one in Burr? The
answer reveals Marshall's seemingly instinctive ability to recognize and
exploit the latent powers of the Supreme Court, powers that former Chief
Justice Jay realized were required but which he failed to discover. In
Marbury the Court would have needed executive compliance if it had
granted the requested remedy. However, in Burr the executive needed the
Court to secure its objective: the conviction and execution of Aaron
Burr.85
Was this the rule of law? Hobson seems implicitly to doubt it. Smith,
on the contrary, seems to see no inconsistency between pragmatism and
principle. Johnson's position is more complicated. On the one hand,
Johnson recognizes Marshall's maneuvers, describing the Chief Justice's
effort in the Cherokee Case "to sidestep a politically dangerous decision.,1 6 On the other hand, Johnson remains convinced of Marshall's
commitment to the rule of law.87 The key may lie in Johnson's own sense
of resignation: "Lawyers and judges are social and political pathologists;

81. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 156. It is not, strictly speaking, accurate to say that in
Marbury Marshall made "the highest government officers answerable to judicial process."
Id. In fact, Marshall found no jurisdiction in his court to do so.
82. Id.
83. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 12. It is curious that none of the three books under review quote
this remarkable sentence.
84. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805-1809, at
300-01, 304 (1974).
85. The Court lacked the force to prevent the Commander-in-Chief from simply having
Burr shot, perhaps pursuant to the order of a court martial, but it certainly possessed the
legal authority to find such a proceeding unlawful-and unconstitutional.
86. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 258.
87. See, e.g., id. at 131 ("All of these limits upon prosecution discretion [in the Burr
Case] were designed to insure that treason indictments were not used for political purposes
and to insure a rule of law and not of men.").
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it is hard to remain an idealist about human nature while serving as a
member of the legal profession."88
This reviewer is inclined to agree that Marshall did maneuver for
advantage, but that he also remained committed to the rule of law. The
profession of the law does strip one of comforting illusions concerning
human nature, but Marshall's gusto for the legal give-and-take almost
reconciles one to this reality. Testing Marshall's faithfulness to the rule of
law in the great constitutional cases is in one sense unfair because

"constitutional adjudication figured in a mere handful of the total judg-

ments handed down by the Court during Marshall's tenure."89 On the
record of these three books, the great Chief Justice kept faith with his own
ideal in all cases, large and small. Marshall listened to the arguments on
both sides, considered the cases fairly and fully, and then exercised his best
judgment. He was always disinterested, in the sense that he sought the best
outcome, not for himself, but for the litigants, the court, and the nation.
However, he also knew that it is not sufficient for a judge merely to cry
"FiatJustitia, ruat coelum" ("Let justice be done, though the heavens
should fall.").' Marbury and his fellow plaintiffs were going to lose
anyway; why did it matter whether they lost on a construction of the
Constitution or of a statute? Marshall believed in maintaining an effective
institution for the fair resolution of disputes. That in itself is the commitment to the rule of law.

88. Id. at 262.
89. HOBSON, supra note 2, at 155.
90. See FIrooT, supra note 24, at 41-42 (discussing Lord Mansfield's judgment in
Sommerseu's Case concerning the legality of slavery in England and concluding: "[A]fter
enlarging, with vague eloquence, upon the maxim, Fiat Justitia, ruat coelum, [Lord
Mansfield] based his judgment on a technical fault in the return to the writ.").
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